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INTRODUCTION
One can no longer speak meaningfully about national law without speaking of law in its
transnational context. Transnational legal ordering now spans public regulatory law, private
business law, and human rights law. These transnationally-shaped legal domains interact. For
example, at the international level, one cannot speak meaningfully about the international law and
politics of trade and intellectual property (IP) law under the World Trade Organization (WTO)
without considering other transnational legal norms, such as economic and social rights. The issues
that these legal domains cover intersect across levels of social organization, from national legal
systems to international regimes.
This chapter proceeds in five parts. Part I examines the complications of normatively
assessing intellectual property protection in light of tradeoffs involving multiple goals, including
knowledge creation, trade governance, economic development, and public health. Part II discusses
the development and interaction of different transnational legal orders (TLOs), by which we refer
to legal orders that go all the way down from international law to national law and local legal
practice, and that interact recursively in both bottom-up and top-down ways. 2 Different
transnational legal orders reflect diverse, and potentially conflicting, values and priorities that
affect national law and practice. The ensuing sections address the tensions between a TLO that
prioritizes trade and intellectual property protection, and one that foregrounds human rights values,
including public health. Part III presents the rise of the TLO for intellectual property, and the
struggles that continue to shape it. Part IV examines the rise of an overlapping and rival TLO based
on the human right to health. This emergent TLO directly challenges some of the central tenets of
the trade and intellectual property TLO. Suddenly states are pushing back and forth over what they
had appeared to have “settled” multilaterally under the TRIPS Agreement. Competing values that
once traveled along separate but parallel tracks are now intersecting and directly clashing, forcing
hard policy choices. Part V concludes with strategies that developing countries can adopt, and
have adopted, to address the challenges of implementing these two transnational legal orders to
advance their development goals, including access to medicines.
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I.
NORMATIVELY EVALUATING IP PROTECTION
From a normative perspective, there is no singular optimal level of intellectual property
protection either globally or nationally. Without transnational legal ordering, the level that a nation
chooses will vary based on the values and priorities that it seeks to advance. In part, these choices
will reflect its level of development and its comparative advantage in innovation and imitation.
Different forms of intellectual property protection are important for the creation and diffusion of
knowledge for economic development. Yet the proper level of intellectual property protection is
an extremely difficult and contested empirical question. 3 Too little protection can undercut
incentives for creative and innovative activity, and thus result in a reduction of social welfare. Too
much protection can obstruct innovation and raise costs for consumers. Thus too much protection
may reduce both the production of knowledge and the ability of the public to use it. Intellectual
property protection may jeopardize the pursuit of other social goals as well, such as access to
medicines. Policy makers must navigate this tension and balance the different policy goals that
reflect divergent values and priorities. In short, determining the appropriate scope and level of IP
protection raises both empirical issues and value choices.
The debates over pharmaceutical patent protection and the WTO’s Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) raise at least five potentially competing
normative priorities with profound distributive implications. These are: monopoly incentives to
induce innovation; free trade; economic development, public health; and the right to life and
human dignity. 4 We discuss each in turn.
Knowledge has some public goods attributes. Once knowledge enters the public domain it
is no longer excludable, and one’s consumption of it does not diminish its availability. And yet,
among the main challenges that intellectual property policy confronts is how to generate this
knowledge, both efficiently and equitably. States have granted temporary monopoly privileges
such as patents in order to provide incentives to innovate. The offering of such legal protection
removes knowledge from the public domain for a defined time period. 5
A legal order of liberalized trade also provides benefits. While it is true that liberalized
trade produces both winners and losers and may give rise to distributional conflicts, one can make
a normative case that trade liberalization results in a wider variety of products being made available
at lower prices. Liberalized trade rewards efficient production and exchange. A liberal trade legal
order also helps to provide predictability to encourage long-term investment and increased
productivity. It further helps countries to avoid the kind of tit-for-tat protectionist measures that
gave rise to the drastic reduction in global trade during the 1930s and had devastating economic
and political consequences. A stable and predictable legal order of liberalized trade can help
countries avoid the temptation of engaging in trade discrimination during financial crises. 6
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A legal order can also prioritize economic development goals in which poorer countries
may “free ride” on the innovations of others, benefitting from imitating their products and making
them available for their citizens at reduced prices. Imitation and reverse engineering are core
mechanisms of this strategy. 7 Through this process, these countries can develop new industries
that eventually can become competitive innovators, as happened with Japan and Korea, and now
appears to be occurring with China. At a later time, these countries may switch their policies
toward granting greater intellectual property protection to further innovation.
Public health has been viewed as a public good since all individuals benefit from the global
curtailment and eradication of diseases and they do not diminish that good when they benefit from
it. 8 Incentives for innovation, such as patents, can contribute to the development of drugs and
treatments to combat disease. Although ideally everyone could benefit equally from effective
advances in medicine, in practice these goods have not been equally available to everyone, in large
part because of their cost.
Finally from a human rights perspective, the availability of disease-eradicating medicines
can be viewed as an integral component of the human right to life and dignity. The normative
priority of the human right to life and dignity can compete or conflict with other important values.
In particular, sharp tensions between human rights and property rights produce political, social,
and economic controversies over pharmaceutical patent protection, as well as issues regarding the
funding of medicines compared to other policy initiatives in a world of scarcity. “Rights” language,
whether applied to human rights or property rights, implies a sense of entitlement in which the
right trumps other policy goals in terms of hierarchy.
The recognition and enforcement of patent rights under TRIPS and other IP treaties can
generate incentives for the production of knowledge and new drugs for public health and the
protection of human life. But the HIV/AIDS pandemic underscored how the protection of
pharmaceutical patent rights may also undermine the benefits of liberalized trade by restricting
consumer access through monopoly pricing power and staving off generic drug competition. These
policies can reduce public health options for containing diseases, and raise human rights concerns
insofar as lack of access leads to unnecessary and preventable deaths.
Societies inevitably must make choices among conflicting normative priorities. 9 The key
institutional question is: who decides the appropriate balancing among policy goals? 10 Choices
between liberalized trade, patent protection, economic development, public health, and human
rights reflect different values, priorities, perspectives, and generate considerable uncertainty.
Policymakers must make institutional choices despite these tradeoffs. The rise of different
transnational legal orders in different substantive domains help frame approaches to these
normative and institutional questions.
II.

THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS
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Social orders increasingly are legalized transnationally, reflecting processes of economic
and cultural globalization. 11 As a result, issues that formerly were viewed as national in scope have
been transformed to have transnational (and sometimes global) dimensions. 12 Whether the social
order concerns protections for intellectual property rights or public health, removal of barriers to
trade or observance of human rights, the ordering of responses to these issues inside the state and
across national frontiers increasingly involves legal norms that transcend national boundaries. We
can define a transnational legal order (TLO) as a collection of formalized legal norms and
associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order behavior that spans national
jurisdictions. 13
The concept of the creation of TLOs addresses the social and political construction of
problems and their resolution. The construction of a problem is not a “natural” one, but involves
actors with particular perceptions, including of their own interests, which advance particular
imaginings of solutions to the problem to create a new order. They increasingly do so by working
to create and institutionalize a legal order that is transnational in scope. Different transnational
legal orders emerge that vary in terms of geographic scope and legal scope. TLOs can vary
geographically, ranging from bilateral, regional, plurilateral, multilateral, to global agreements.
Such range is illustrated by law applying to the European Union, to North America under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), to parts of South America under the Andean Pact, to
countries spanning the Pacific under the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, to
countries spanning the globe under the WTO and the United Nations (UN). They also vary by
substantive legal focus, such as over trade, investment, finance, environmental protection,
intellectually property, public health, and human rights. These TLOs, of varying legal and
geographic scope operate simultaneously, sometimes incognizant of each other, sometimes in
competition with each other, and sometimes in antagonistic interaction with each other. They can
thus be seen as varying along two dimensions: (1) the degree of settlement of the transnational
legal norms, and (2) the extent of issue alignment among existing TLOs. 14
The politics of international trade and IP law in relation to pharmaceutical patents
increasingly involves the interaction of such transnational legal orders. In particular, it involves
the interaction of TLOs focused on trade and intellectual property protection, and TLOs focused
on human rights. These transnational legal orders involve recursive interaction between
transnational legal norm-making and national implementation. They may feature conflicts among
TLOs not only transnationally but also within nation states.
The issue of access to medicines, in particular, has been characterized by a high degree of
contestation and a significant lack of alignment among international institutions over the last
decade. The result has been significant tension among TLOs that previously were distinct and
segregated, those of IP, trade, and the human right to health. As Laurence Helfer shows, one can
see the interaction of these TLOs in terms of three time periods. In the first period, the TLOs were
separate, did not interact, and their norms were relatively open-ended and unsettled transnationally.
In the second period, an IP-trade TLO became predominant and its norms appeared to be relatively
11
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settled transnationally. In the third period, the IP TLO on pharmaceutical patents became unsettled
in light of developments in a parallel TLO on the economic and social right to health care. 15
Before the mid-1990s, the IP and economic and social rights TLOs were entirely distinct
and relatively unsettled. Under the IP TLO, there was considerable debate within the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) as to what form of special and differential treatment
should be applied to developing countries, and there were few substantive requirements for patents
other than application of non-discrimination norms. Similarly, under the UN International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the scope of an economic and social
right to health was contested among states and civil society actors. Yet, although there was
contestation within these TLOs, there was no interaction between them. States were thus largely
unconstrained in adapting the IP and right to health legal norms that they desired, including
regarding access to medicines.
From the mid-1990s until around 2000, in light of the incorporation of IP into the WTO
package of agreements, and the negotiation of new bilateral and plurilateral agreements containing
TRIPS-plus provisions, 16 countries around the world adopted new IP laws, including for the
patenting of pharmaceutical products. There appeared to be settlement as to the applicable legal
norms in this domain, which many observers and civil society actors decried. As a result, countries
were considerably more constrained in providing inexpensive drugs to patients pursuant to a right
to health.
Since around 2000, a new transnational legal order for the economic and social right of
access to medicines has become institutionalized. It has done so as a result of a number of factors,
and in particular the resistance of states, non-state actors, and international human rights and health
organizations to the IP TLO. The salience of the AIDS epidemic where improved access to
medicines could save millions of lives helped to precipitate the emergence of this rival TLO.
Powerful business interests supported by their home states nonetheless continued to push for
greater IP protection, including through bilateral and plurilateral agreements, leading to
considerable normative dissensus and contestation, as well as competing constraints for
developing countries from these rival transnational legal orders.
III.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TLO FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Law is often viewed as producing social order out of conflict. But in studying law, we also
need to assess how law reflects power. Law, in this sense, is Janus-faced, involving both the
creation of normative order and the reflection of power. Legal realist scholars have long noted this
aspect of law, but it has often been elided in legal scholarship. 17 As the political scientist Michael
Barnett writes:
Power and legitimacy [such as legal legitimacy] . . . are not conflicting concepts
but rather are complementary ones. The powerful, too, want their actions to be
15
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viewed as legitimate, if only to maintain their power and further their interests.
Even the powerful, in this view, cannot act in an expedient and narrowly selfinterested manner and must observe international society's underlying rules and
norms. 18
The United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU) use a variety of means to shape IP
rules transnationally. They use the carrot of granting access to their valuable markets, and the stick
of threatening to withdraw such access, in order to pressure countries to raise IP standards. They
have the material resources to engage in negotiations in multiple fora to advance their interests,
and are the protagonists in creating institutions that shape and constrain what can be discussed
within them. They have the knowledge resources to shape understandings, including through the
provision of technical assistance and capacity building which frame issues in particular ways. For
example, representatives of pharmaceutical trade associations work with U.S. and EU officials to
draft “model” laws and to teach as “faculty” in workshops organized by WIPO on intellectual
property law and its enforcement. 19
The very concept of “intellectual property” is a social and political construction.
Alternative organizing concepts could be used and institutionalized through law, such as “access
to knowledge,” or “knowledge for development,” but the concept of “intellectual property” has
been globalized. The concept is, for example, at odds with many traditional and indigenous
approaches to knowledge and ideas, and countries have varied over time in the extent of intellectual
property protection available in light of their stage of development. The original signatories to the
Berne and Paris Conventions, respectively, for patent and copyright protection were primarily
developed countries. 20 Over time, countries have adopted IP laws that mirrored those of the former
colonizer, or tailored IP laws to reflect perceptions of domestic interests. 21 For example, a number
of developing countries would not issue patents on pharmaceutical products and agricultural
chemicals. 22 In fact, before 1970, the United States was among a small minority of countries that
offered patents on pharmaceutical products. 23
Much has been written about the strategies of the powerful that led to the creation of the
TRIPS Agreement. 24 In a strategic move, the United States integrated IP into trade policies during
18
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the 1980s, using the threat of withdrawing market access to constrain the ability of developing
countries to resist demands for greater IP protection. The U.S. used, and continues to use, its
Special 301 procedure under which countries are placed on watch lists of varying priority
regarding their IP protections. 25 From 1985-1995, at least eighteen countries reformed national
laws to strengthen patent protection due to other measures by the U.S. and EU. 26 Working closely
with private trade associations, these strategies eventually facilitated the inclusion of the TRIPS
Agreement as part of the WTO’s single package of agreements. 27 A country could not benefit from
WTO market access opportunities unless it also agreed to be bound by the TRIPS Agreement’s IP
requirements.
A. The TRIPS Agreement and its Flexibilities
The TRIPS Agreement set forth unprecedented strong mandatory, minimum standards of
IP rules, and applied them to countries regardless of level of development, although with different
deadlines for implementation which have been extended for least developed countries. 28 The
Agreement obliges WTO members to implement these minimum standards for most categories of
IP. For patents, it requires protection for all fields of technology for a minimum of twenty years.29
It also requires states to ensure that private IP rights holders can take “effective action” against IP
infringement, and help enforce IP rights through border measures and criminal law. 30 The liberal
trade economist Jagdish Bhagwati thus writes that the TRIPS Agreement “positions the WTO
primarily as a collector of intellectual property-related rents on behalf of multinational
corporations.” 31 The financial burden of the agreement’s implementation and enforcement is
considerable. World Bank economists have estimated that the agreement has cost less developed
countries $60 billion a year. 32
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Paradoxically, although the TRIPS Agreement imposes significant obligations on states to
protect the holders of IP rights, commentators now commonly refer to the flexibilities in its
provisions to counter U.S. and EU demands for ever greater IP requirements. Although the most
stringent at the time it was signed, the TRIPS Agreement provides for interpretive options, such
as what constitutes novelty and an inventive step for purposes of granting a patent. Among the
most important of the exceptions for patents for developing countries are: the right of parallel
importation; the right to grant compulsory licenses; and ‘Bolar’ exceptions for generic drug
companies to prepare a drug under patent for marketing authorization once the patent expires. 33
The TRIPS Agreement restricts the use of compulsory licensing to certain specified
conditions, and in particular for predominant use for only the domestic market. 34 The explosion of
the AIDS crisis and international protests against the effect of pharmaceutical patents on public
health placed pressure on the WTO to facilitate the use of compulsory licenses and other TRIPS
“flexibilities.” In 2001, WTO members negotiated the Doha Declaration on Public Health 35 and
they adopted a waiver in August 2003 that enables any member country to import pharmaceutical
products under a compulsory license (although the conditions of the waiver are still contested for
being too stringent). 36 This decision could assist those developing countries that lack the domestic
manufacturing capacity to produce pharmaceuticals themselves under a compulsory license. A
number of developing countries have since issued compulsory licenses, mostly related to public
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health or government use. 37 Perhaps even more importantly, some larger developing countries
have used the threat of compulsory licenses to gain leverage in negotiation with patent holders to
lower prices. 38
The ‘Bolar’ exception (named after the U.S. Roche v. Bolar case) permits generic drug
producers to make use of patented materials during the patent term for the purpose of acquiring
marketing approval and obtaining registration of a generic version of a branded drug. This
exception helps to expedite bringing generic versions to market upon expiration of the patent.39
Because it facilitates a more rapid entry of lower cost generic drugs, the Bolar exception can lower
prices for both government health agencies and individual consumers. A WTO panel in the
Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products case interpreted Article 30 of the TRIPs
Agreement to permit such exceptions. 40 Developing countries, however, so far have not widely
adopted Bolar-type exceptions, particularly because many lack a generic industry. A 2006 survey
of 106 developing countries showed that less than 10 had adopted explicit Bolar-type provisions.41
In contrast, a much greater number of developing countries have permitted parallel imports
of pharmaceutical products. Pharmaceutical companies provide opportunities for parallel imports
whenever they practice price discrimination across diverse markets. A patent holder may charge
“x” for a drug in one territorial market, and “x+100” for that same drug in another territorial
market. Parallel importing provides a country with the opportunity to import a drug from the
territorial market that offers the “x” price, rather than the “x+100” price, thereby containing costs.
Such practices create an incentive for developing countries to import patented products from
lower-priced markets. A 2006 sample of fifty-four developing countries showed that thirty-three
permitted parallel imports. The countries varied, however, as to whether they recognized
“exhaustion” of intellectual property rights upon first sale in the world or only in a region. 42 TRIPs
Article 6 permits countries to choose their preferred exhaustion system. Under a national or
domestic exhaustion regime, when an IPR owner sells a good in a foreign market, she retains her
right to prevent that genuine good from entering the domestic market where the IP right has not
been “exhausted.”. In other words, she has a right to prevent parallel importation. Generally,
37
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See Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the
Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921,
951 (2007) (“[T]he Brazilian government has used the threat of compulsory licenses to pressure foreign
multinational patent holders to significantly lower the prices charged for [antiretroviral treatments]”).
39
See generally, DEERE, supra note 19, at 81. See also, Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the TwentyFirst Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1138 (2009) (describing a
Chinese Bolar exception “which permits generic producers to reverse-engineer patented medicines to conduct
clinical trials prior to the expiration of the patent”).
40
See Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products: Report of the Panel, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 17,
2000), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7428d.pdf; see also DEERE, supra note 19, at 81.
41
DEERE, supra note 19, at 79–81. For example, “Argentina’s patent law states that any third party may use a
product or process protected by patent prior to its expiration ‘to obtain the information required for the approval of a
product or process by the competent authority so that it may be marketed following the patent expiration.” Id.
42
DEERE, supra note 19, at 75.
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international exhaustion regimes, in contrast to national ones, should expand access to medicines
at a lower price because they facilitate parallel importation and deny the patent holder the right to
block such imports because a first sale of the good anywhere in the world exhausts the domestic
IP right. 43
B. The Proliferation of Bilateral and Plurilateral Agreements after TRIPS
For leading industrialized countries such as the United States, the TRIPS Agreement
represented only a foundation on which further IP protection could be built. They considered the
TRIPS standards to be a floor, constituting absolute minimum standards, whereas many
developing countries considered them to be a ceiling above which they would not have to go. At
the conclusion of the TRIPS negotiations, a leading U.S. advocate proclaimed that, “we got 95%
of what we wanted.” 44
In subsequent developments, the 5% that TRIPS proponents failed to achieve has
prominently featured in U.S. and EU bilateral and plurilateral agreements. These agreements have
eliminated many of the flexibilities provided in the TRIPS Agreement. 45 For example, many of
them prohibit the practice of parallel importation of cheaper patented drugs and restrict the
conditions under which countries may issue compulsory licenses. These provisions are examples
of the exact features that U.S.- and OECD-based pharmaceutical firms sought, but failed to obtain,
in the TRIPS negotiations. These new agreements are invariably TRIPS-plus agreements, because
they expand requirements from the base that the TRIPS Agreement set, and TRIPS-minus
agreements, in that they eliminate many TRIPS flexibilities. 46 As a result, these bilateral, regional,
and plurilateral IP agreements reduce access to lower cost products and may jeopardize generic
competition.
With respect to essential medicines, TRIPS-minus provisions limit a number of pertinent
flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement, such as parallel importation, and compulsory licenses.
To restrict parallel importation, TRIPs-minus provisions may provide the patent owner with an
exclusive right to prohibit parallel importing contractually, thus curtailing a country’s ability to
access more affordable patented drugs, 47 as under the U.S. FTAs with Australia, Morocco and
Singapore. 48 The granting of compulsory licenses may be limited to narrowly specified conditions,

43
Carsten Fink, Comment: Competition Law as a Means of Containing Intellectual Property Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REGIME 771 (Keith Maskus & Jerome Reichman eds., 2005).
44
SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 48
(2003).
45
Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Form Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, AND TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
447, 448 (2011). Deere discusses a number of other tools used to push developing countries to implement stronger
IP protection, including bilateral investment treaties, Special 301 threats, diplomatic threats, and industry pressure,
such as direct lobbying by the pharmaceutical sector in developing countries. See DEERE, supra note 19, at 154–64.
The WTO website indicates that, “[a]s of 15 November 2011, some 505 RTAs (counting goods and services
notifications separately) have been notified to the GATT/WTO.” Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
46
See, e.g., Sell, supra note 40, at 448.
47
Id. at 453–54.
48
See DEERE, supra note 19, at 338–40 (listing the US FTAs with Singapore, Morocco, and Australia as containing
provisions where “patent holders may limit parallel imports of pharmaceutical products through licensing
contracts.”).
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considerably more restrictive than under the TRIPs Agreement. 49 The U.S. FTAs with Australia,
Jordan, Singapore and Vietnam, for example, contain provisions that limit compulsory licenses to
situations such as national emergencies, public non-commercial use, and as an antitrust remedy. 50
The TRIPS-plus provisions include expanded data-exclusivity requirements, patent linkage
for marketing approvals, and lengthier patent terms. 51 Some FTAs have included more stringent
data-exclusivity requirements designed to force generic manufacturers to generate their own test
data, as opposed to being able to rely on the findings of the brand name companies. 52 The aim is
to further delay generic competition and thus prolong the payment of higher prices to U.S. and EU
rights holders. The U.S. has FTAs with provisions that expand test data protection for
pharmaceutical products with at least thirteen developing countries, including Vietnam, Jordan,
Chile, Singapore, Morocco, Australia, Bahrain, and the countries of the Dominican RepublicCentral American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA): that is, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. 53 These data exclusivity
provisions significantly extend TRIPs Article 39.3, which requires WTO members to protect
undisclosed test data against unfair competition. 54
Many FTAs also require that the registration of medicines by health authorities be linked
to patent protection. As a consequence, governmental authorities cannot register a drug that
remains under patent protection. The treaties require regulatory authorities to notify the patent
holder if a generic competitor attempts to register a generic version of a drug. This enrolls
regulatory authorities into the patent enforcement process, mimicking the U.S. Hatch-Waxman
regime. Free Trade Agreements that contain provisions prohibiting marketing approval of a
generic drug during the patent term, unless authorized by the patent owner, include the U.S. FTAs
with Singapore, Chile, Morocco, Australia, Bahrain, and the countries of the DR-CAFTA. 55
In combination, many U.S. FTAs prohibit generic producers from challenging a patent
until after it has been granted. U.S. proposals for the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations would

49

Sell discusses the detrimental effect of the interplay between TRIPS-Plus provisions. For example, the ability of a
state to issue compulsory licenses is affected by data exclusivity provisions and drug registration/patent linkage
provisions. As a result, “prospective licensees are unlikely to replicate test data, and government cannot normally
wait until a new set of test data has been developed.” Sell, supra note 40, at 454.
50
See DEERE, supra note 19, at 338–40.
51
See Carlos M. Correa, Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on Access to Medicines, 84 BULL. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 399, 401 (2006); see also Sell, supra note 40, at 452–55.
52
For example TRIPS-Plus data exclusivity requirements are included in U.S. FTAs with Morocco, Bahrain,
Singapore, Australia, and DR-CAFTA. See Carsten Fink and Patrick Reichenmiller, “Tightening TRIPS: Intellectual
Property Provisions of U.S. Free Trade Agreements”, Richard Newfarmer, ed., TRADE, DOHA, and
DEVELOPMENT: A WINDOW INTO THE ISSUES (The World Bank: Washington D.C., 2006): 291.
53
See DEERE, supra note 19, at 338–40; Sell, supra note 40, at 453.
54
See Sell, supra note 40, at 453.
55
See DEERE, supra note 19, at 338–40. TRIPS-Plus U.S. FTAs include: The United States – Chile Free Trade
Agreement, www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text; The United States –
Singapore Free Trade Agreement, www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/singapore-fta/final-text; The United States –
Morocco Free Trade Agreement, www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/morocco-fta/final text; The United States Australia Free Trade Agreement, www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/australia-fta/final-text; The United States –
Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bahrain-fta/final-text; the Dominican Republic –
Central America - United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), www.cafta-dr-dominican-republic-centralamerica-fta/final-text.
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expressly forbid pre-grant opposition.56 Pre-grant opposition provisions in national laws permit
generic producers to contest the patent application as it is filed. Without pre-grant opposition,
generic producers wishing to challenge the validity of a drug patent have to wait until the patent
has been granted and may have to engage in a costly and time-consuming judicial process. These
provisions thus effectively block a generic company from obtaining marketing authorization from
health authorities during the period that a patent is contested, again creating delays for generic
companies and stalling competition..57
In addition, a number of FTAs expand the patent term to make up for delays in the
application process. They thus may significantly extend the 20-year period of patent protection
provided under the TRIPs Agreement. The US. has FTAs with Vietnam, Jordan, Singapore, Chile,
Morocco, Australia, Bahrain, and the DR-CAFTA which all contain provisions that provide patent
term extensions for delays caused by regulatory approval processes. 58
The bilateral TRIPS-plus agreements are complemented by a unique “certification” process
pursuant to which the U.S. Executive must certify to the U.S. Congress that the foreign country
has modified its laws in compliance with the agreement in order for the agreement to take effect. 59
This certification process, in practice, requires the foreign country to show its draft legislation to
the U.S. executive and receive its approval. The U.S. typically demands changes in such
legislation, triggering a new, one-sided negotiation over that country’s implementing legislation.
The aim of the U.S. executive is, once more, to reduce any flexible interpretations of the
agreement’s requirements. In contrast, and asymmetrically, under U.S. law, the bilateral agreement
will have no effect if it conflicts with any existing or subsequent U.S. law. 60
These TRIPS-plus agreements are part of a U.S. strategy to divide developing countries.
Those countries that have already increased IP protections under an FTA with the U.S. have
nothing to lose from their being multilateralized (and perhaps much to gain as other developing
countries and their constituencies will then have to pay increased royalties and license fees to U.S.
companies as well). Over time, as developing country holdouts become isolated, a tipping point
could be reached through which the more stringent legal requirements become multilateralized. 61
The U.S. so far has been unsuccessful in negotiating enhanced patent protections in
multilateral fora since the TRIPs Agreement. Thus the U.S. has pursued not only bilateral FTAs,
but also plurilateral agreements. In particular, it initially failed in its efforts to negotiate a

56

Draft: Trans-Pacific Partnership—Intellectual Property Rights Chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Feb. 10,
2011), http://www.keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf. For discussion, see Sean
Flynn, Brook Baker, Margot Kaminski & Jimmy Koo, The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 106 (2012).
57
See DEERE, supra note 19, at 338.
58
See id. at 338–40; see also Correa, supra note 46, at 401.
59
For example, the U.S. Congress passed an implementation bill in the United States –Central American-Dominican
Republic Free Trade Agreement that requires the President to certify that the signatories have complied with the
FTA provisions before its entry into force. Dominican Republic-Central American- United States Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, Publ. L. 109-53, 109th Cong., 1st sess. (2005), Section 101, “Approval and Entry
into Force of the Agreement”; see also: ”Bush secures CAFTA vote in last hours with renewed textile pledge”,
Inside U.S. Trade July 29 (2005), (World Trade Online).
60
Frederick Abbott, “Intellectual Property Provisions of Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements in Light of U.S.
Federal Law”, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 12, February 2006;
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1912621 , 3-5.
61
Peter Drahos, Bits and Bips, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001).
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Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) under the auspices of WIPO. 62 The U.S. then led efforts
with Japan to strengthen IP enforcement through a new Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA), which the USTR calls “the highest-standard plurilateral agreement ever achieved
concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.” 63 Signed by eight countries on
October 1, 2011, 64 non-signatories may be affected since the U.S. undoubtedly will press for
countries to adopt its provisions as a condition for new FTAs. 65 Indeed, the Office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) maintains that “it looks forward to partnering with developing
countries through ACTA, and cooperating with ACTA partners to provide technical assistance to
developing countries.” 66
Many commentators have noted the unbalanced nature of ACTA, finding that it favors
rights-holders. 67 Unlike the WTO Doha negotiating text 68 and the WIPO Development Agenda, 69
ACTA includes no development dimension. It lacks language concerning limitations and
exceptions for fair use of copyrights, and early drafts of ACTA would have endorsed in-transit
seizures of generic drugs 70 It creates a new ACTA Committee to oversee IP enforcement under its
terms. The U.S. now views ACTA as the new (raised) floor for IP enforcement.
ACTA constitutes a “club” agreement in which only industrialized countries interested in
strong IP protection were invited to participate. 71 Argentina, Brazil, India and China were thus
62

See, e.g., Sell, supra note 40, at 455 (“In intellectual property norm setting, developing countries successfully
rebuffed the U.S. and European efforts to pursue a TRIPS-plus Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) at WIPO.”).
After painstaking negotiations to resume formal discussion, in late 2010 the Standing Committee on the Law of
Patents agreed to begin work on multilateral agreements on exceptions and limitations and patent quality. William
New and Kaitlin Mara, “WIPO Returns to Substantive Patent Law Talks after 5 years with Balance”, Intellectual
Property Watch, 10/16/2010. Available at: http://www.ip-watch.org/2010/10/16/wipo-returns-to-substantive-patentlaw-talks-after -5-years-with-balance/print; Kimberlee Weatherall, “Three Lessons from ACTA and it Political
Aftermath”, 35 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 575 (2012).
63
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last
visited Mar. 15, 2013).
64
The signatories were the U.S., Australia, Canada, Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Morocco, and Singapore. Id.
65
Sell, supra note 40, at 456 (“Inevitably, TRIPS-plus ACTA provisions will reappear in bilateral and regional trade
agreements going forward in an effort to raise global standards of protection.”).
66
Trade Facts: Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Aug. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2008/asset_upload_file760_15084.pdf.
67
See Sell, supra note 40, at 457; Sean Flynn, “Learning from ACTA: Toward a Positive Agenda for TPP”, (March
3, 2012). Available at: http://www.infojustice.org/archives/8650 ; Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview and the
Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 385, 394–95 (2011); J. Janewa
Oseitutu, “Value Divergence in Global Intellectual Property Law”, 87 Ind. L.J., 1639, 1667-69 (2012); Andrew
Rens, “Enforcement Theater: The Enforcement Agenda and the Institutionalization of Enforcement Theater in the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement”, 35 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 553, 556 (2012).
68
WT/MIN (05)/DEC 22 December 2005 “Doha Work Programme Ministerial Declaration (adopted 12/18/2005)
available at: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.htm
69
WIPO Doc. A/43/16 Annex A. (September 2007)
70
Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview and the Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 21 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 385, 394–95 (2011) (“The only time ACTA mentions limitations or exceptions is in its discussion of
technological circumvention measures, stating that “appropriate” limitations or exceptions may be maintained or
adopted by parties in providing for remedies for the circumvention of technological measures.”); Weatherall, 2012,
577.
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Daniel Gervais, “International Decision”, 103 Am. J. Int’l L. 549, 555 (2009); Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its
Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1 (Nov. 2011); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479,
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excluded. The draft texts were also kept from the public so that there was less opportunity to shape
debates. The final agreement, moreover, was not even being presented to the U.S. Congress for
ratification, but rather went into effect as a so-called sole “Executive Agreement” on the grounds
that it is a trade agreement, and not an IP agreement. 72 However, it is a trade agreement in name
only, and not in substance. 73 Had it been negotiated as an IP agreement under WIPO’s auspices,
the treaty would have had to be presented to the Senate requiring a 2/3rds supra-majority approval
under the Treaty presentment clause of the U.S. constitution. The future of ACTA, nonetheless,
remains uncertain after the European Parliament overwhelmingly voted against it. Hundreds of
thousands of Europeans took to the streets to protest ACTA in February 2012 and the European
Union has suspended ratification. 74
The U.S. is now actively negotiating to join another plurilateral agreement, the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. Leaked negotiating texts indicate that the U.S. aims to
introduce more TRIPs-Plus provisions. 75 In these negotiations, the U.S. now looks to ACTA and
the 2011 U.S.-Korea FTA as providing the new “gold standard” for IP protection and
enforcement. 76 In sum, industrialized countries continue to work with the pharmaceutical and
entertainment industries to build an enhanced IP transnational legal order.
IV.

THE EMERGENCE OF A COUNTERVAILING TLO FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
RIGHTS
Implementing the TRIPs Agreement has been more of a challenge than the U.S. and Europe
initially contemplated. 77 It has been so, in large part, because a countervailing process of
transnational legal ordering has emerged with a different normative frame, one with a human rights
focus. 78 Developing countries, non-state actors, and UN-based organizations have advanced this
frame at the international and national levels both to counter the push for ever stronger IP
protections, and to spur recognition and application of a right to health in public policy more
generally. As the right to health becomes institutionalized nationally and transnationally, it too can
be viewed as a TLO. It interacts with and rivals the TLO for IP protection when the two overlap
in addressing an issue, such as access to life-saving medicines.
At the international level, developing countries have found support from the World Health
Organization (WHO) Assembly, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCHR), the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Health, and the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS. The WHO Constitution establishes that
72

Jack Goldsmith & Lawrence Lessig, Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement Raises Constitutional Concerns, WASH.
POST, Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/25/AR2010032502403.html
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74
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http://www.infojustice.org/archives/8650; Susan K. Sell, Revenge of the “Nerds”: Collective Action Against
Intellectual Property Maximalism in the Global Information Age, INT’L STUDIES REV., Vol. 15, No. 1 (2013).
75
For a detailed analysis, see Flynn, Baker, Kaminski & Koo, supra note 50.
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“the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of
every human being.” 79 The right to health also is incorporated in multiple human rights
instruments, including the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, and the United Nations Human Rights
Council. 80 The UNHCHR identified access to essential medicines as “a vital component of
fulfilling the right to health.” 81 The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) include access to
essential medicines; the MDG Gap Task Force Report 2012 advised that “developing countries
should carefully assess possible adverse impacts on access to medicines when adopting Trips-Plus
provisions.” 82
Such rights advocacy helped to build alternative normative framings and pressure for the
amendment and interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement in light of social welfare concerns, as
reflected in the negotiation of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health in 2001. Egypt,
Brazil, and Argentina, supported in parallel by powerful campaigns by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), proposed and succeeded in establishing the WIPO Development Agenda. 83
The WIPO Development Agenda has been viewed as “a call for restraint on the part of developed
countries in their crusade for ever-stronger IP protection.” 84 After six years of debate, WIPO
adopted a series of recommendations related to the Development Agenda in 2007, and temporarily
suspended negotiations for a new Substantive Patent Law Treaty that industrialized countries had
promoted. 85 Even though critics contend that WIPO remains part of a transnational legal culture
focused on IP protection as defined predominantly by industrialized country legal systems,
WIPO’s Development Agenda reflects a move to a more development-friendly approach to IP,
endorsing access to technology and benefit-sharing. 86
Institutionalizing the human right to health has gained momentum at the regional and
national levels as well. Laurence Helfer and Karen Alter have analyzed the Andean Community’s
successful regional pro-access to medicines decisions in the Andean Tribunal. 87 They demonstrate
79

WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG. & WORLD TRADE ORG., PROMOTING ACCESS TO
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84
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DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2009).,
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that Andean governments required the adoption of TRIPs flexibilities in implementation. The
Andean Tribunal has been able to combat TRIPS-Plus provisions by enforcing bans on pipeline
patents, second-use patents, and placing limits on data exclusivity. 88
The development of a rival economic and social rights frame, most importantly, is reflected
at the national level in the growth of new transnational constitutional law movements. 89 Although
there is a small body of literature on the role of constitutionalism in international law, 90 it is this
bottom-up transnational constitutional movement that is the key development, representing a
sweep of judicialization and rights adjudication around the world. 91 This movement diffuses
constitutional law norms across national jurisdictions that can be used to interpret international
law commitments, such as those under the TRIPS Agreement and the ICESCR. As a joint report
of the WHO, WIPO and the WTO notes, “[b]y 2009, 135 countries had incorporated aspects of
the right to health in their national constitutions.” 92
Brazil, India, and South Africa have enjoyed some notable success in implementing
provisions facilitating access to medicines and the use of TRIPs flexibilities. They all successfully
have warded off legal challenges from originator drug firms and their government sponsors. 93
India, for example, defended itself against the Swiss pharmaceutical firm Novartis’ challenge to
India’s right to implement flexibilities to prevent evergreening. 94 In April 2013 The Indian
Supreme Court upheld the Indian Patent Office’s decision to deny Novartis a patent on its drug
Gleevec. 95 India and Brazil also lodged complaints at the WTO against the European Union and
the Netherlands, in May 2010, for seizing generic drugs in transit. In its complaint, India invoked
relevant TRIPs provisions as well as the Doha Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health
88
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and Article 12(1) of the ICESCR, “which recognizes the right of all persons to the enjoyment of
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” 96 India and Brazil obtained a
favorable settlement as a result. 97
Smaller countries such as Ecuador also have been champions of promoting access to health.
For example, a coalition of local generic drug producers, social, environmental and indigenous
organizations enjoyed the strong support of Ecuador’s President Correa who rejected a proposed
U.S.-Ecuador FTA. In doing so, they framed intellectual property rights as “an urgent health
issue.” 98
Around the world, national courts have become bolder in overseeing human rights
protections, including economic and social rights, such as the right to health. National courts in
Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, South Africa, Kenya, and
Venezuela have recognized HIV/AIDS patients’ rights to access to medicines. 99 As Laurence
Helfer points out, “a 2006 study identified seventy-one cases from twelve countries invoking a
right of access to medicines, with a success rate of 83 percent.” 100 This national move in
developing countries of incorporating a human rights frame can also contribute, and in a number
of countries already has contributed, to interpreting and shaping the definition of IP rights at the
national level.
V.
STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The development of a rival human rights transnational legal order has created pressure to
shape patent law in developing countries for social ends. Toward this end, developing countries
can adopt pragmatic strategies to shape and tailor IP legal norms and practices. This chapter
concludes by raising five complementary strategies, two concerning substantive matters and three
institutional ones. 101
A. Substantive strategies
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A number of developing countries and their stakeholders have adopted two complementary
strategies to shape IP norms. On the one hand, they have participated in the development of a rival
TLO that can affect the interpretation and application of IP law, that of economic and social rights.
On the other hand, they may apply long-established U.S. and EU exceptions to IP protections in
new ways to address broader social goals, strategically building from the foreign to meet local
needs.
1. Developing alternative normative frames for the interpretation of international IP
norms.
As John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos contend in their book Global Business Regulation,
less powerful stakeholders in global debates fare better if they invest resources in developing
principle-based normative frames. These frames can then be combined with technical expertise to
apply them. Otherwise, such expertise will tend to work within normative frames created by
powerful actors, such as the U.S. and EU, and diffused through technical assistance programs,
whether through WIPO, WTO, bilateral or private sector programs. The U.S., for example,
arguably has the strongest protections of free speech in the world under the First Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution, which it does not compromise in applying policies in overlapping policy
domains. Developing countries can do the same using the normative frames of human rights,
consumer protection, access to medicines, and access to knowledge in applying IP law. As is
already evident in the right to health context, these frames can be transnationalized through the
support of allied civil society groups and international institutions, furthering the development of
a rival TLO that can be used for local ends.
2. Citing U.S. and EU precedents while transforming them for national purposes.
As the French child psychologist Jean Piaget writes, “to comprehend is to invent.”102
Developing countries are required to implement international IP law that they have signed and
ratified, which sets forth particular concepts, standards and rules. They can do so, however, in light
of their development needs by inventing while implementing, by adapting while adopting. The
U.S. and EU legal systems for IP include exceptions which reflect U.S. and EU social goals.
Developing countries can strategically cite these exceptions conceptually, but apply them in new
ways, thereby building from the foreign in a manner that advances the local. In this way,
developing countries can help to foil U.S. and EU pressures by noting that they are applying
exceptions recognized in U.S. and EU law itself, and applied by their courts, 103 even if U.S. and
EU courts in practice would apply the exceptions differently. For example, Indian courts have
limited the granting of injunctive relief to curtail access to generic medicines, creatively citing
U.S. jurisprudence for support. In a 2008 case, Roche v. Cipla, the Indian court determined that it
would apply the normal Indian standards for granting a preliminary injunction, which are more
limited than the standards demanded by IP rights holders. Interestingly, the Indian court creatively
cited a US case, eBay v. MercExchange, and a non-precedential U.S. Federal Circuit decision that
noted public health concerns, to affirm the denial of an injunction in a case involving a drug-eluting
102
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stent. 104 The Indian court concluded that harm to third parties would be irreparable and denied a
preliminary injunction, even though it appears that U.S. courts would have regularly granted it
under U.S. case law. 105
Additional opportunities may exist for using U.S. precedents and practices in the area of
antitrust/competition law that have sought to balance protecting innovation while trying to
constrain health care costs. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has fined brand name
companies that pursue strategies of product launches that “‘serve no purpose other than to
undermine the ability of a generic to compete.’” 106 The FTC is more likely to pursue a case in
which the plaintiff can demonstrate: “(1) reduced consumer choice; (2) additional conduct aimed
at preventing generic substitution, and (3) little or no demonstrable medical benefit from
substitution.”107 Such strategies could support efforts to prevent evergreening and other market
manipulations to stave off generic competition. While hardly a panacea, adopting and
implementing strong competition laws to reduce IP-related abuses of monopoly positions is a
strategy that has been advocated and implemented in a number of countries, such as South
Africa. 108
B. Institutional strategies
Institutional strategies complement substantive ones. Developing countries have
implemented a number of institutional strategies to advance their positions and thwart pressure on
them. They have invested in developing local technical expertise that can build links regionally
and transnationally.
1. Developing Local Expertise.
Developing countries need to develop not only normative frames for addressing the tradehuman rights-IP nexus; they also need technical expertise to apply it. In this way, they become
entrepreneurs and not simply adapters of U.S. and EU legal norms that are institutionalized through
international law and technical assistance implementation programs. This local IP expertise will
need to be broad-based, embedded within government institutions, and include representatives of
generic producers of pharmaceuticals, academics, and civil society. 109 In this way, developing
104
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countries can better institutionalize alternative frames for addressing the IP- trade-human rights
nexus at the national level.
Governments need to create strong institutions with professional expertise. Patent offices,
for example, must make critical determinations in approving patents, as must courts in reviewing
challenges to them. Peter Drahos has written extensively about the development of expertise in
developing country patent offices in order for them to make independent decisions and not simply
follow analyses made in the U.S. and European Patent Office (EPO). 110 The Indian legal system,
as well as a number of Latin American systems, for example, provides for important substantive
and procedural innovations, 111 but these provisions will only have meaning if institutions apply
them in practice. Institutions are most likely to implement them in practice if they are pressed to
do so by legal advocates working with the generic pharmaceutical sector and civil society,
supported by academics. 112
2. Pooling resources.
One way that expertise can be built and diffused is by pooling resources through regional,
transnational, and international alliances specializing in trade-related intellectual property
issues. 113 The Andean Pact provides an example of how such expertise can be institutionalized. 114
Regional centers can provide a forum for the sharing of experiences and the identification of best
practices. These centers can work with academics, or be tied to academic institutions. UNCTAD’s
development-oriented initiatives can serve as a node in this network. 115 However, regional
institutions can be captured if they are not developed in a bottom-up manner, as Carolyn Deere
demonstrates in her study of the French West African organization for intellectual property, OAPI
(Organisation Africaine de la Propriété Intellectuelle). 116 Thus, broad-based initiatives that include
health activists and generic pharmaceutical producers are, once more, central.
3. Coordinating with Allies in Industrialized Countries.
Finally, developing countries will need to continue to, coordinate with private parties and
government authorities in the United States and Europe to undercut industry pressure in the
formation of U.S. and EU negotiating positions and strategies. International negotiations involve
a two-level game in which national constituencies compete in the formation of national positions
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and those national positions are then advanced in international negotiations. 117 Developing
countries can work with U.S. and European political allies to alter the U.S. and European domestic
political calculus. If developing countries cannot neutralize the clout of large pharmaceutical firms
in the formation of U.S. and European positions, then developing countries will face the full brunt
of U.S. and European pressure in the negotiation and enforcement of pharmaceutical patent rights.
In a world of asymmetric power, developing countries enhance the prospects of their
success if other U.S. and European constituencies offset the pharmaceutical industry’s pressure on
U.S. and European trade authorities to aggressively advance industry interests. Domestic and
international non-governmental advocates, such as ACT UP, Doctors Without Borders, and
Oxfam, have, directly and indirectly, been allies. They raise fundamental moral issues that are
picked up in the media and that help to hold U.S. and EU political leaders accountable. They also
harness the public’s self-interest over the cost of prescription drugs and public officials’ struggles
to finance health care commitments within the United States and Europe themselves, potentially
“destabilizing the consensus that U.S. business elites had built around TRIPS.” 118
This strategy has worked in a number of cases. The United States backed off from
challenging South Africa’s and Brazil’s patent laws primarily in the context of U.S. domestic
political pressures. AIDS activists gathered at Vice President Gore’s presidential campaign stops
holding placards for the nightly news and chanting “Gore’s greed kills” to press the administration
to change its policy on South Africa. 119 The Bush administration withdrew the United States’ claim
against Brazil’s compulsory licensing provisions under Brazil’s patent law following similar
protests. 120 United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick again deflected U.S.
pharmaceutical industry pressures in agreeing to the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health at Doha. 121 U.S. negotiators were similarly pressed by a Democratic Congress to
alter its negotiating positions in the FTAs with Columbia and Panama, ultimately concluded in
2011, to retain more flexibility for providing access to medicines. 122 In short, when TRIPS issues
become politicized domestically within the United States and Europe, developing countries retain
greater leeway to develop intellectual property policies to fit their own needs.
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CONCLUSION
The construction of transnational legal orders provides normative ordering that addresses
issues perceived to be problems that are transnational in scope. It thereby constrains and facilitates
domestic law and practice. Developing countries can benefit from transnational legal ordering, but
such ordering also can reflect the particular interests of powerful countries and constituencies
within them. As regards the transnational legal ordering of trade and IP, constituencies within
developing countries increasingly demand that their countries retain the flexibility to implement
IP protection in a manner that respects human rights and development concerns.
Paradoxically, these countries profit from, and are also constrained by, a rival legal order
that is also transnational in scope — that of the economic and social right to health. On the one
hand, a number of developing countries have adopted strategies to deploy this rival TLO to
advance their goals. Countries such as India and Brazil, for example, have attempted to adapt
patent law in innovative ways, in part to meet the demands of constituencies within them to further
a human right to health care. On the other hand, such constituencies have pressed the government
to provide health services on human rights grounds that the government otherwise would have
foregone, whether because of budgetary priorities or otherwise. Today, national law is made in
transnational context, and national policies are being adapted accordingly. To understand and
participate effectively in legal processes, one increasingly needs to think transnationally.

22

